27 ideas
| 18859 | Metaphysics is a quest for truthmakers [Tallant] |
| 18861 | Maybe number statements can be paraphrased into quantifications plus identities [Tallant] |
| 15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
| 18866 | Maybe only 'positive' truths need truth-makers [Tallant] |
| 18860 | A truthmaker is the minimal portion of reality that will do the job [Tallant] |
| 18863 | What is the truthmaker for a possible new power? [Tallant] |
| 15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
| 15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
| 15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
| 15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
| 15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
| 15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
| 15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
| 7548 | Classes, grouped by a convenient property, are logical constructions [Russell] |
| 15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
| 15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
| 7545 | Visible things are physical and external, but only exist when viewed [Russell] |
| 18864 | The wisdom of Plato and of Socrates are not the same property [Tallant] |
| 18865 | Substance must have two properties: individuation, and property-bearing [Tallant] |
| 7549 | If my body literally lost its mind, the object seen when I see a flash would still exist [Russell] |
| 7553 | Sense-data are purely physical [Russell] |
| 7546 | A man is a succession of momentary men, bound by continuity and causation [Russell] |
| 7550 | We could probably, in principle, infer minds from brains, and brains from minds [Russell] |
| 18862 | Are propositions all the thoughts and sentences that are possible? [Tallant] |
| 7551 | Matter is a logical construction [Russell] |
| 7547 | Matter requires a division into time-corpuscles as well as space-corpuscles [Russell] |
| 7552 | Six dimensions are needed for a particular, three within its own space, and three to locate that space [Russell] |