22 ideas
18859 | Metaphysics is a quest for truthmakers [Tallant] |
18861 | Maybe number statements can be paraphrased into quantifications plus identities [Tallant] |
15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
18866 | Maybe only 'positive' truths need truth-makers [Tallant] |
18860 | A truthmaker is the minimal portion of reality that will do the job [Tallant] |
18863 | What is the truthmaker for a possible new power? [Tallant] |
15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
15464 | The distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties leads to confusion [Lewis] |
18864 | The wisdom of Plato and of Socrates are not the same property [Tallant] |
15463 | All dispositions must have causal bases [Lewis] |
15461 | A 'finkish' disposition is real, but disappears when the stimulus occurs [Lewis] |
18865 | Substance must have two properties: individuation, and property-bearing [Tallant] |
15462 | Backtracking counterfactuals go from supposed events to their required causal antecedents [Lewis] |
18862 | Are propositions all the thoughts and sentences that are possible? [Tallant] |