Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)', 'The Varieties of Necessity' and 'Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals'

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26 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
15647 Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
15649 In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
15655 Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
15654 If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
15650 Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
15648 Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
15656 Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
15657 To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
15652 We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
15651 Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
9216 Each area of enquiry, and its source, has its own distinctive type of necessity [Fine,K]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
9214 Unsupported testimony may still be believable [Fine,K]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
3926 The human heart has a natural concern for public good [Hume]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
3929 No moral theory is of any use if it doesn't serve the interests of the individual concerned [Hume]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
3925 Personal Merit is the possession of useful or agreeable mental qualities [Hume]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
3922 Justice only exists to support society [Hume]
23560 If we all naturally had everything we could ever desire, the virtue of justice would be irrelevant [Hume]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
3918 Moral philosophy aims to show us our duty [Hume]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
3919 Conclusions of reason do not affect our emotions or decisions to act [Hume]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
3928 Virtue just requires careful calculation and a preference for the greater happiness [Hume]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
3923 No one would cause pain to a complete stranger who happened to be passing [Hume]
3924 Nature makes private affections come first, because public concerns are spread too thinly [Hume]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
3921 The safety of the people is the supreme law [Hume]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
3927 Society prefers helpful lies to harmful truth [Hume]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
3920 If you equalise possessions, people's talents will make them unequal again [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
9215 Causation is easier to disrupt than logic, so metaphysics is part of nature, not vice versa [Fine,K]