20 ideas
15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
17751 | Gödel proved the completeness of first order predicate logic in 1930 [Gödel, by Walicki] |
15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
23438 | Full rationality must include morality [Foot] |
23437 | Practical reason is goodness in choosing actions [Foot] |
23436 | It is an odd Humean view to think a reason to act must always involve caring [Foot] |
23431 | Human defects are just like plant or animal defects [Foot] |
23433 | Humans need courage like a plant needs roots [Foot] |
23432 | Concepts such as function, welfare, flourishing and interests only apply to living things [Foot] |
23434 | There is no fact-value gap in 'owls should see in the dark' [Foot] |
23439 | Principles are not ultimate, but arise from the necessities of human life [Foot] |
23435 | If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?' [Foot] |