25 ideas
15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
13941 | Are the truth-bearers sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgements, propositions or statements? [Cartwright,R] |
13942 | Logicians take sentences to be truth-bearers for rigour, rather than for philosophical reasons [Cartwright,R] |
15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
13945 | A token isn't a unique occurrence, as the case of a word or a number shows [Cartwright,R] |
8851 | Coherentists say that regress problems are assuming 'linear' justification [Williams,M] |
8849 | Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist [Williams,M] |
8853 | Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content [Williams,M] |
8855 | Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M] |
8852 | In the context of scepticism, externalism does not seem to be an option [Williams,M] |
13950 | People don't assert the meaning of the words they utter [Cartwright,R] |
13948 | For any statement, there is no one meaning which any sentence asserting it must have [Cartwright,R] |
13944 | We can pull apart assertion from utterance, and the action, the event and the subject-matter for each [Cartwright,R] |
13947 | 'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same [Cartwright,R] |
13943 | We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said [Cartwright,R] |
13946 | To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words [Cartwright,R] |
13951 | Assertions, unlike sentence meanings, can be accurate, probable, exaggerated, false.... [Cartwright,R] |