83 ideas
8927 | Philosophy moves essentially in the element of universality [Hegel] |
21776 | Philosophy aims to reveal the necessity and rationality of the categories of nature and spirit [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
16325 | Analysis rests on natural language, but its ideal is a framework which revises language [Halbach] |
8935 | Without philosophy, science is barren and futile [Hegel] |
22082 | Truth does not appear by asserting reasons and then counter-reasons [Hegel] |
22035 | The structure of reason is a social and historical achievement [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
8932 | Truth does not come from giving reasons for and against propositions [Hegel] |
16292 | An explicit definition enables the elimination of what is defined [Halbach] |
16307 | Don't trust analogies; they are no more than a guideline [Halbach] |
16330 | Truth-value 'gluts' allow two truth values together; 'gaps' give a partial conception of truth [Halbach] |
16339 | Truth axioms prove objects exist, so truth doesn't seem to be a logical notion [Halbach] |
16324 | Any definition of truth requires a metalanguage [Halbach] |
16293 | Traditional definitions of truth often make it more obscure, rather than less [Halbach] |
16301 | If people have big doubts about truth, a definition might give it more credibility [Halbach] |
7077 | The true is the whole [Hegel] |
16297 | Semantic theories avoid Tarski's Theorem by sticking to a sublanguage [Halbach] |
16337 | Disquotational truth theories are short of deductive power [Halbach] |
16322 | CT proves PA consistent, which PA can't do on its own, so CT is not conservative over PA [Halbach] |
16294 | Axiomatic truth doesn't presuppose a truth-definition, though it could admit it at a later stage [Halbach] |
16326 | The main semantic theories of truth are Kripke's theory, and revisions semantics [Halbach] |
16311 | To axiomatise Tarski's truth definition, we need a binary predicate for his 'satisfaction' [Halbach] |
16318 | Compositional Truth CT has the truth of a sentence depending of the semantic values of its constituents [Halbach] |
16299 | Gödel numbering means a theory of truth can use Peano Arithmetic as its base theory [Halbach] |
16340 | Truth axioms need a base theory, because that is where truth issues arise [Halbach] |
16305 | We know a complete axiomatisation of truth is not feasible [Halbach] |
16313 | A theory is 'conservative' if it adds no new theorems to its base theory [Halbach, by PG] |
16315 | The Tarski Biconditional theory TB is Peano Arithmetic, plus truth, plus all Tarski bi-conditionals [Halbach] |
16314 | Theories of truth are 'typed' (truth can't apply to sentences containing 'true'), or 'type-free' [Halbach] |
16327 | Friedman-Sheard is type-free Compositional Truth, with two inference rules for truth [Halbach] |
16329 | Kripke-Feferman theory KF axiomatises Kripke fixed-points, with Strong Kleene logic with gluts [Halbach] |
16332 | The KF theory is useful, but it is not a theory containing its own truth predicate [Halbach] |
16331 | The KF is much stronger deductively than FS, which relies on classical truth [Halbach] |
16319 | Compositional Truth CT proves generalisations, so is preferred in discussions of deflationism [Halbach] |
16320 | Some say deflationism is axioms which are conservative over the base theory [Halbach] |
16338 | Deflationism says truth is a disquotation device to express generalisations, adding no new knowledge [Halbach] |
16317 | The main problem for deflationists is they can express generalisations, but not prove them [Halbach] |
16316 | Deflationists say truth is just for expressing infinite conjunctions or generalisations [Halbach] |
16335 | In Strong Kleene logic a disjunction just needs one disjunct to be true [Halbach] |
16334 | In Weak Kleene logic there are 'gaps', neither true nor false if one component lacks a truth value [Halbach] |
16309 | Every attempt at formal rigour uses some set theory [Halbach] |
16333 | The underestimated costs of giving up classical logic are found in mathematical reasoning [Halbach] |
16310 | A theory is some formulae and all of their consequences [Halbach] |
16342 | You cannot just say all of Peano arithmetic is true, as 'true' isn't part of the system [Halbach] |
16341 | Normally we only endorse a theory if we believe it to be sound [Halbach] |
16344 | Soundness must involve truth; the soundness of PA certainly needs it [Halbach] |
16347 | Many new paradoxes may await us when we study interactions between frameworks [Halbach] |
16336 | The liar paradox applies truth to a negated truth (but the conditional will serve equally) [Halbach] |
16321 | The compactness theorem can prove nonstandard models of PA [Halbach] |
16343 | The global reflection principle seems to express the soundness of Peano Arithmetic [Halbach] |
16312 | To reduce PA to ZF, we represent the non-negative integers with von Neumann ordinals [Halbach] |
16308 | Set theory was liberated early from types, and recent truth-theories are exploring type-free [Halbach] |
16345 | That Peano arithmetic is interpretable in ZF set theory is taken by philosophers as a reduction [Halbach] |
16346 | Maybe necessity is a predicate, not the usual operator, to make it more like truth [Halbach] |
23551 | It is necessary for a belief that it be held for a length of time [Fricker,M] |
15611 | I develop philosophical science from the simplest appearance of immediate consciousness [Hegel, by Hegel] |
8928 | The Absolute is not supposed to be comprehended, but felt and intuited [Hegel] |
8929 | In the Absolute everything is the same [Hegel] |
21774 | Genuine idealism is seeing the ideal structure of the world [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
8934 | Being is Thought [Hegel] |
21773 | Experience is immediacy, unity, forces, self-awareness, reason, culture, absolute being [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
22033 | Hegel tried to avoid Kant's dualism of neutral intuitions and imposed concepts [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
21771 | Consciousness derives its criterion of knowledge from direct knowledge of its own being [Hegel] |
23558 | Offering knowledge needs accuracy and sincerity; receiving it needs testimonial justice [Fricker,M] |
23550 | Burge says we are normally a priori entitled to believe testimony [Fricker,M] |
23552 | We assess testimonial probabilities by the speaker, the listener, the facts, and the circumstances [Fricker,M] |
23553 | Testimonial judgement is not logical, but produces reasons and motivations [Fricker,M] |
23555 | Assessing credibility involves the impact of both the speaker's and the listener's social identity [Fricker,M] |
20741 | Consciousness is shaped dialectically, by opposing forces and concepts [Hegel, by Aho] |
21770 | Consciousness is both of objects, and of itself [Hegel] |
5647 | Hegel claims knowledge of self presupposes desire, and hence objects [Hegel, by Scruton] |
5648 | For Hegel knowledge of self presupposes objects, and also a public and moral social world [Hegel, by Scruton] |
23554 | Judgements can be unreflective and non-inferential, yet rational, by being sensitive to experience [Fricker,M] |
16298 | We need propositions to ascribe the same beliefs to people with different languages [Halbach] |
23557 | To judge agents in remote times and cultures we need a moral resentment weaker than blame [Fricker,M] |
8930 | The in-itself must become for-itself, which requires self-consciousness [Hegel] |
8936 | Human nature only really exists in an achieved community of minds [Hegel] |
22034 | Modern life needs individuality, but must recognise that human agency is social [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
21987 | History is the progress of the consciousness of freedom [Hegel] |
8931 | The movement of pure essences constitutes the nature of scientific method [Hegel] |
8933 | Science confronts the inner necessities of objects [Hegel] |
21775 | The God of revealed religion can only be understood through pure speculative knowledge [Hegel] |
6917 | God is the essence of thought, abstracted from the thinker [Hegel, by Feuerbach] |
6915 | Hegel made the last attempt to restore Christianity, which philosophy had destroyed [Hegel, by Feuerbach] |