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All the ideas for 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth', 'Epistemic Injustice' and 'Phenomenology of Spirit'

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83 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophy moves essentially in the element of universality [Hegel]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
Philosophy aims to reveal the necessity and rationality of the categories of nature and spirit [Hegel, by Houlgate]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Analysis rests on natural language, but its ideal is a framework which revises language [Halbach]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Without philosophy, science is barren and futile [Hegel]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
Truth does not appear by asserting reasons and then counter-reasons [Hegel]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
The structure of reason is a social and historical achievement [Hegel, by Pinkard]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Truth does not come from giving reasons for and against propositions [Hegel]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
An explicit definition enables the elimination of what is defined [Halbach]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
Don't trust analogies; they are no more than a guideline [Halbach]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Truth-value 'gluts' allow two truth values together; 'gaps' give a partial conception of truth [Halbach]
Truth axioms prove objects exist, so truth doesn't seem to be a logical notion [Halbach]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Any definition of truth requires a metalanguage [Halbach]
Traditional definitions of truth often make it more obscure, rather than less [Halbach]
If people have big doubts about truth, a definition might give it more credibility [Halbach]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
The true is the whole [Hegel]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
Semantic theories avoid Tarski's Theorem by sticking to a sublanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
Disquotational truth theories are short of deductive power [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
CT proves PA consistent, which PA can't do on its own, so CT is not conservative over PA [Halbach]
Axiomatic truth doesn't presuppose a truth-definition, though it could admit it at a later stage [Halbach]
The main semantic theories of truth are Kripke's theory, and revisions semantics [Halbach]
To axiomatise Tarski's truth definition, we need a binary predicate for his 'satisfaction' [Halbach]
Compositional Truth CT has the truth of a sentence depending of the semantic values of its constituents [Halbach]
Gödel numbering means a theory of truth can use Peano Arithmetic as its base theory [Halbach]
Truth axioms need a base theory, because that is where truth issues arise [Halbach]
We know a complete axiomatisation of truth is not feasible [Halbach]
A theory is 'conservative' if it adds no new theorems to its base theory [Halbach, by PG]
The Tarski Biconditional theory TB is Peano Arithmetic, plus truth, plus all Tarski bi-conditionals [Halbach]
Theories of truth are 'typed' (truth can't apply to sentences containing 'true'), or 'type-free' [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 2. FS Truth Axioms
Friedman-Sheard is type-free Compositional Truth, with two inference rules for truth [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 3. KF Truth Axioms
Kripke-Feferman theory KF axiomatises Kripke fixed-points, with Strong Kleene logic with gluts [Halbach]
The KF theory is useful, but it is not a theory containing its own truth predicate [Halbach]
The KF is much stronger deductively than FS, which relies on classical truth [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Compositional Truth CT proves generalisations, so is preferred in discussions of deflationism [Halbach]
Some say deflationism is axioms which are conservative over the base theory [Halbach]
Deflationism says truth is a disquotation device to express generalisations, adding no new knowledge [Halbach]
The main problem for deflationists is they can express generalisations, but not prove them [Halbach]
Deflationists say truth is just for expressing infinite conjunctions or generalisations [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
In Strong Kleene logic a disjunction just needs one disjunct to be true [Halbach]
In Weak Kleene logic there are 'gaps', neither true nor false if one component lacks a truth value [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Every attempt at formal rigour uses some set theory [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
The underestimated costs of giving up classical logic are found in mathematical reasoning [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
A theory is some formulae and all of their consequences [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
You cannot just say all of Peano arithmetic is true, as 'true' isn't part of the system [Halbach]
Normally we only endorse a theory if we believe it to be sound [Halbach]
Soundness must involve truth; the soundness of PA certainly needs it [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
Many new paradoxes may await us when we study interactions between frameworks [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
The liar paradox applies truth to a negated truth (but the conditional will serve equally) [Halbach]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
The compactness theorem can prove nonstandard models of PA [Halbach]
The global reflection principle seems to express the soundness of Peano Arithmetic [Halbach]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
To reduce PA to ZF, we represent the non-negative integers with von Neumann ordinals [Halbach]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
Set theory was liberated early from types, and recent truth-theories are exploring type-free [Halbach]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
That Peano arithmetic is interpretable in ZF set theory is taken by philosophers as a reduction [Halbach]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Maybe necessity is a predicate, not the usual operator, to make it more like truth [Halbach]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
It is necessary for a belief that it be held for a length of time [Fricker,M]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
I develop philosophical science from the simplest appearance of immediate consciousness [Hegel, by Hegel]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
The Absolute is not supposed to be comprehended, but felt and intuited [Hegel]
In the Absolute everything is the same [Hegel]
Genuine idealism is seeing the ideal structure of the world [Hegel, by Houlgate]
Being is Thought [Hegel]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Experience is immediacy, unity, forces, self-awareness, reason, culture, absolute being [Hegel, by Houlgate]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Hegel tried to avoid Kant's dualism of neutral intuitions and imposed concepts [Hegel, by Pinkard]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Consciousness derives its criterion of knowledge from direct knowledge of its own being [Hegel]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
Offering knowledge needs accuracy and sincerity; receiving it needs testimonial justice [Fricker,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
Burge says we are normally a priori entitled to believe testimony [Fricker,M]
We assess testimonial probabilities by the speaker, the listener, the facts, and the circumstances [Fricker,M]
Testimonial judgement is not logical, but produces reasons and motivations [Fricker,M]
Assessing credibility involves the impact of both the speaker's and the listener's social identity [Fricker,M]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Consciousness is shaped dialectically, by opposing forces and concepts [Hegel, by Aho]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
Consciousness is both of objects, and of itself [Hegel]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
Hegel claims knowledge of self presupposes desire, and hence objects [Hegel, by Scruton]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
For Hegel knowledge of self presupposes objects, and also a public and moral social world [Hegel, by Scruton]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Judgements can be unreflective and non-inferential, yet rational, by being sensitive to experience [Fricker,M]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
We need propositions to ascribe the same beliefs to people with different languages [Halbach]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
To judge agents in remote times and cultures we need a moral resentment weaker than blame [Fricker,M]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
The in-itself must become for-itself, which requires self-consciousness [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Human nature only really exists in an achieved community of minds [Hegel]
Modern life needs individuality, but must recognise that human agency is social [Hegel, by Pinkard]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
History is the progress of the consciousness of freedom [Hegel]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
The movement of pure essences constitutes the nature of scientific method [Hegel]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
Science confronts the inner necessities of objects [Hegel]
28. God / B. Proving God / 1. Proof of God
The God of revealed religion can only be understood through pure speculative knowledge [Hegel]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
God is the essence of thought, abstracted from the thinker [Hegel, by Feuerbach]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Hegel made the last attempt to restore Christianity, which philosophy had destroyed [Hegel, by Feuerbach]