100 ideas
| 18137 | Impredicative definitions are wrong, because they change the set that is being defined? [Bostock] |
| 15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
| 15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
| 15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
| 15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
| 15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
| 15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
| 15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
| 18122 | Classical interdefinitions of logical constants and quantifiers is impossible in intuitionism [Bostock] |
| 18114 | There is no single agreed structure for set theory [Bostock] |
| 15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
| 18107 | A 'proper class' cannot be a member of anything [Bostock] |
| 18115 | We could add axioms to make sets either as small or as large as possible [Bostock] |
| 18139 | The Axiom of Choice relies on reference to sets that we are unable to describe [Bostock] |
| 18105 | Replacement enforces a 'limitation of size' test for the existence of sets [Bostock] |
| 18108 | First-order logic is not decidable: there is no test of whether any formula is valid [Bostock] |
| 18109 | The completeness of first-order logic implies its compactness [Bostock] |
| 15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
| 15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
| 18123 | Substitutional quantification is just standard if all objects in the domain have a name [Bostock] |
| 18120 | The Deduction Theorem is what licenses a system of natural deduction [Bostock] |
| 18125 | Berry's Paradox considers the meaning of 'The least number not named by this name' [Bostock] |
| 18101 | Each addition changes the ordinality but not the cardinality, prior to aleph-1 [Bostock] |
| 18100 | ω + 1 is a new ordinal, but its cardinality is unchanged [Bostock] |
| 18102 | A cardinal is the earliest ordinal that has that number of predecessors [Bostock] |
| 18106 | Aleph-1 is the first ordinal that exceeds aleph-0 [Bostock] |
| 18095 | Instead of by cuts or series convergence, real numbers could be defined by axioms [Bostock] |
| 18099 | The number of reals is the number of subsets of the natural numbers [Bostock] |
| 18093 | For Eudoxus cuts in rationals are unique, but not every cut makes a real number [Bostock] |
| 18110 | Infinitesimals are not actually contradictory, because they can be non-standard real numbers [Bostock] |
| 18156 | Modern axioms of geometry do not need the real numbers [Bostock] |
| 18097 | The Peano Axioms describe a unique structure [Bostock] |
| 18148 | Hume's Principle is a definition with existential claims, and won't explain numbers [Bostock] |
| 18145 | Many things will satisfy Hume's Principle, so there are many interpretations of it [Bostock] |
| 18149 | There are many criteria for the identity of numbers [Bostock] |
| 18143 | Frege makes numbers sets to solve the Caesar problem, but maybe Caesar is a set! [Bostock] |
| 18116 | Numbers can't be positions, if nothing decides what position a given number has [Bostock] |
| 18117 | Structuralism falsely assumes relations to other numbers are numbers' only properties [Bostock] |
| 18141 | Nominalism about mathematics is either reductionist, or fictionalist [Bostock] |
| 18157 | Nominalism as based on application of numbers is no good, because there are too many applications [Bostock] |
| 18150 | Actual measurement could never require the precision of the real numbers [Bostock] |
| 18158 | Ordinals are mainly used adjectively, as in 'the first', 'the second'... [Bostock] |
| 18127 | Simple type theory has 'levels', but ramified type theory has 'orders' [Bostock] |
| 18144 | Neo-logicists agree that HP introduces number, but also claim that it suffices for the job [Bostock] |
| 18147 | Neo-logicists meet the Caesar problem by saying Hume's Principle is unique to number [Bostock] |
| 18146 | If Hume's Principle is the whole story, that implies structuralism [Bostock] |
| 18129 | Many crucial logicist definitions are in fact impredicative [Bostock] |
| 18111 | Treating numbers as objects doesn't seem like logic, since arithmetic fixes their totality [Bostock] |
| 18159 | Higher cardinalities in sets are just fairy stories [Bostock] |
| 18155 | A fairy tale may give predictions, but only a true theory can give explanations [Bostock] |
| 18140 | The best version of conceptualism is predicativism [Bostock] |
| 18138 | Conceptualism fails to grasp mathematical properties, infinity, and objective truth values [Bostock] |
| 18131 | If abstracta only exist if they are expressible, there can only be denumerably many of them [Bostock] |
| 18134 | Predicativism makes theories of huge cardinals impossible [Bostock] |
| 18135 | If mathematics rests on science, predicativism may be the best approach [Bostock] |
| 18136 | If we can only think of what we can describe, predicativism may be implied [Bostock] |
| 18133 | The usual definitions of identity and of natural numbers are impredicative [Bostock] |
| 18132 | The predicativity restriction makes a difference with the real numbers [Bostock] |
| 18121 | In logic a proposition means the same when it is and when it is not asserted [Bostock] |
| 21167 | Gravity is unusual, in that it always attracts and never repels [New Sci.] |
| 21176 | In the Big Bang general relativity fails, because gravity is too powerful [New Sci.] |
| 21147 | Quantum electrodynamics incorporates special relativity and quantum mechanics [New Sci.] |
| 21155 | Photons have zero rest mass, so virtual photons have infinite range [New Sci.] |
| 21161 | In the standard model all the fundamental force fields merge at extremely high energies [New Sci.] |
| 21146 | Electrons move fast, so are subject to special relativity [New Sci.] |
| 21148 | The strong force is repulsive at short distances, strong at medium, and fades at long [New Sci.] |
| 21151 | Gluons, the particles carrying the strong force, interact because of their colour charge [New Sci.] |
| 21152 | The strong force binds quarks tight, and the nucleus more weakly [New Sci.] |
| 21150 | Three different colours of quark (as in the proton) can cancel out to give no colour [New Sci.] |
| 21143 | Quarks in threes can build hadrons with spin ½ or with spin 3/2 [New Sci.] |
| 21142 | Classifying hadrons revealed two symmetry patterns, produced by three basic elements [New Sci.] |
| 21145 | The four fundamental forces (gravity, electromagnetism, weak and strong) are the effects of particles [New Sci.] |
| 21153 | The weak force explains beta decay, and the change of type by quarks and leptons [New Sci.] |
| 21154 | Three particles enable the weak force: W+ and W- are charged, and Z° is not [New Sci.] |
| 21156 | The weak force particles are heavy, so the force has a short range [New Sci.] |
| 21164 | Why do the charges of the very different proton and electron perfectly match up? [New Sci.] |
| 21170 | The Standard Model cannot explain dark energy, survival of matter, gravity, or force strength [New Sci.] |
| 21140 | Spin is a built-in ration of angular momentum [New Sci.] |
| 21149 | Quarks have red, green or blue colour charge (akin to electric charge) [New Sci.] |
| 21158 | Fermions, with spin ½, are antisocial, and cannot share quantum states [New Sci.] |
| 21165 | Spin is akin to rotation, and is easily measured in a magnetic field [New Sci.] |
| 21157 | Particles are spread out, with wave-like properties, and higher energy shortens the wavelength [New Sci.] |
| 21163 | The mass of protons and neutrinos is mostly binding energy, not the quarks [New Sci.] |
| 21168 | Gravitional mass turns out to be the same as inertial mass [New Sci.] |
| 21138 | Neutrons are slightly heavier than protons, and decay into them by emitting an electron [New Sci.] |
| 21144 | Top, bottom, charm and strange quarks quickly decay into up and down [New Sci.] |
| 21141 | Neutrinos were proposed as the missing energy in neutron beta decay [New Sci.] |
| 21169 | Only neutrinos spin anticlockwise [New Sci.] |
| 21166 | Standard antineutrinos have opposite spin and opposite lepton number [New Sci.] |
| 21171 | The symmetry of unified electromagnetic and weak forces was broken by the Higgs field [New Sci.] |
| 21179 | Supersymmetric string theory can be expressed using loop quantum gravity [New Sci.] |
| 21178 | String theory is now part of 11-dimensional M-Theory, involving p-branes [New Sci.] |
| 21175 | String theory might be tested by colliding strings to make bigger 'stringballs' [New Sci.] |
| 21177 | String theory offers a quantum theory of gravity, by describing the graviton [New Sci.] |
| 21162 | Only supersymmetry offers to incorporate gravity into the scheme [New Sci.] |
| 21159 | Supersymmetry has extra heavy bosons and heavy fermions [New Sci.] |
| 21173 | Supersymmetry says particles and superpartners were unities, but then split [New Sci.] |
| 21172 | The evidence for supersymmetry keeps failing to appear [New Sci.] |
| 21160 | The Higgs field means even low energy space is not empty [New Sci.] |
| 21174 | Dark matter must have mass, to produce gravity, and no electric charge, to not reflect light [New Sci.] |