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All the ideas for 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)', 'Logicism, Some Considerations (PhD)' and 'Varieties of Ontological Dependence'

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22 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
17311 Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
15647 Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
15649 In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
15655 Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
15654 If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
15650 Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
15648 Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
15656 Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
15657 To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
15652 We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
15651 Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
13412 Obtaining numbers by abstraction is impossible - there are too many; only a rule could give them, in order [Benacerraf]
13413 We must explain how we know so many numbers, and recognise ones we haven't met before [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
13411 If numbers are basically the cardinals (Frege-Russell view) you could know some numbers in isolation [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
17312 It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
13415 An adequate account of a number must relate it to its series [Benacerraf]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
17314 The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
17313 Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
17309 For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki]
17315 We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
17317 A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
17316 We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki]