Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)', 'Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect' and 'On Concept and Object'

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25 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
A thought can be split in many ways, so that different parts appear as subject or predicate [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
There is the concept, the object falling under it, and the extension (a set, which is also an object) [Frege, by George/Velleman]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Frege mistakenly takes existence to be a property of concepts, instead of being about things [Frege, by Yablo]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
It is unclear whether Frege included qualities among his abstract objects [Frege, by Hale]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
Frege's 'objects' are both the referents of proper names, and what predicates are true or false of [Frege, by Dummett]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
Frege equated the concepts under which an object falls with its properties [Frege, by Dummett]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic
As I understand it, a concept is the meaning of a grammatical predicate [Frege]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
Frege felt that meanings must be public, so they are abstractions rather than mental entities [Frege, by Putnam]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
For all the multiplicity of languages, mankind has a common stock of thoughts [Frege]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
A 'double effect' is a foreseen but not desired side-effect, which may be forgivable [Foot]
The doctrine of double effect can excuse an outcome because it wasn't directly intended [Foot]
Double effect says foreseeing you will kill someone is not the same as intending it [Foot]
Without double effect, bad men can make us do evil by threatening something worse [Foot]
Double effect seems to rely on a distinction between what we do and what we allow [Foot]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Abortion is puzzling because we do and don't want the unborn child to have rights [Foot]