19 ideas
22138 | Science rests on scholastic metaphysics, not on Hume, Kant or Carnap [Boulter] |
15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
22134 | Thoughts are general, but the world isn't, so how can we think accurately? [Boulter] |
22150 | Logical possibility needs the concepts of the proposition to be adequate [Boulter] |
3016 | Even the gods cannot strive against necessity [Pittacus, by Diog. Laertius] |
22139 | Experiments don't just observe; they look to see what interventions change the natural order [Boulter] |
22136 | Science begins with sufficient reason, de-animation, and the importance of nature [Boulter] |
22135 | Our concepts can never fully capture reality, but simplification does not falsify [Boulter] |
22152 | Aristotelians accept the analytic-synthetic distinction [Boulter] |
22156 | The facts about human health are the measure of the values in our lives [Boulter] |