Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)', 'Principles of Philosophy' and 'A Tour through Mathematical Logic'

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52 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
The greatest good for a state is true philosophers [Descartes]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / b. Terminology of PL
A 'tautology' must include connectives [Wolf,RS]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / c. Derivation rules of PL
Deduction Theorem: T∪{P}|-Q, then T|-(P→Q), which justifies Conditional Proof [Wolf,RS]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / d. Universal quantifier ∀
Universal Specification: ∀xP(x) implies P(t). True for all? Then true for an instance [Wolf,RS]
Universal Generalization: If we prove P(x) with no special assumptions, we can conclude ∀xP(x) [Wolf,RS]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / e. Existential quantifier ∃
Existential Generalization (or 'proof by example'): if we can say P(t), then we can say something is P [Wolf,RS]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / e. Axiom of the Empty Set IV
Empty Set: ∃x∀y ¬(y∈x). The unique empty set exists [Wolf,RS]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / n. Axiom of Comprehension
Comprehension Axiom: if a collection is clearly specified, it is a set [Wolf,RS]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
In first-order logic syntactic and semantic consequence (|- and |=) nicely coincide [Wolf,RS]
First-order logic is weakly complete (valid sentences are provable); we can't prove every sentence or its negation [Wolf,RS]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Model theory uses sets to show that mathematical deduction fits mathematical truth [Wolf,RS]
Model theory reveals the structures of mathematics [Wolf,RS]
Model theory 'structures' have a 'universe', some 'relations', some 'functions', and some 'constants' [Wolf,RS]
First-order model theory rests on completeness, compactness, and the Löwenheim-Skolem-Tarski theorem [Wolf,RS]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
An 'isomorphism' is a bijection that preserves all structural components [Wolf,RS]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
The LST Theorem is a serious limitation of first-order logic [Wolf,RS]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
If a theory is complete, only a more powerful language can strengthen it [Wolf,RS]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 10. Monotonicity
Most deductive logic (unlike ordinary reasoning) is 'monotonic' - we don't retract after new givens [Wolf,RS]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
An ordinal is an equivalence class of well-orderings, or a transitive set whose members are transitive [Wolf,RS]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Modern mathematics has unified all of its objects within set theory [Wolf,RS]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
All powers can be explained by obvious features like size, shape and motion of matter [Descartes]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Five universals: genus, species, difference, property, accident [Descartes]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
A universal is a single idea applied to individual things that are similar to one another [Descartes]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
If we perceive an attribute, we infer the existence of some substance [Descartes]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
A substance needs nothing else in order to exist [Descartes]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
A substance has one principal property which is its nature and essence [Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
Total doubt can't include your existence while doubting [Descartes]
I think, therefore I am, because for a thinking thing to not exist is a contradiction [Descartes]
'Thought' is all our conscious awareness, including feeling as well as understanding [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
'Nothing comes from nothing' is an eternal truth found within the mind [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
We can know basic Principles without further knowledge, but not the other way round [Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
We can understand thinking occuring without imagination or sensation [Descartes]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
In thinking we shut ourselves off from other substances, showing our identity and separateness [Descartes]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Our free will is so self-evident to us that it must be a basic innate idea [Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
There are two ultimate classes of existence: thinking substance and extended substance [Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Even if tightly united, mind and body are different, as God could separate them [Descartes]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
Most errors of judgement result from an inaccurate perception of the facts [Descartes]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
The greatest perfection of man is to act by free will, and thus merit praise or blame [Descartes]
We do not praise the acts of an efficient automaton, as their acts are necessary [Descartes]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Physics only needs geometry or abstract mathematics, which can explain and demonstrate everything [Descartes]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
We will not try to understand natural or divine ends, or final causes [Descartes]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension
Matter is not hard, heavy or coloured, but merely extended in space [Descartes]