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All the ideas for 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)', 'Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity' and 'Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction''

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28 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Concern for rigour can get in the way of understanding phenomena [Fine,K]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
There is no stage at which we can take all the sets to have been generated [Fine,K]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
We might combine the axioms of set theory with the axioms of mereology [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
If you ask what F the second-order quantifier quantifies over, you treat it as first-order [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
Assigning an entity to each predicate in semantics is largely a technical convenience [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Dedekind cuts lead to the bizarre idea that there are many different number 1's [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts
Why should a Dedekind cut correspond to a number? [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / l. Zero
Unless we know whether 0 is identical with the null set, we create confusions [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
Set-theoretic imperialists think sets can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Logicists say mathematics can be derived from definitions, and can be known that way [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
A generative conception of abstracts proposes stages, based on concepts of previous objects [Fine,K]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Abstraction-theoretic imperialists think Fregean abstracts can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K]
We can combine ZF sets with abstracts as urelements [Fine,K]
We can create objects from conditions, rather than from concepts [Fine,K]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
It is not a law if not endorsed by the public [Hooker,R]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / b. Rule of law
Rule of law is superior to autonomy, because citizens can see what is expected [Hooker,R]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Human laws must accord with the general laws of Nature [Hooker,R]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Natural things observe certain laws, and things cannot do otherwise if they retain their forms [Hooker,R]