Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)', 'Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity' and 'Truth-making and Correspondence'

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26 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
18365 If truths are just identical with facts, then truths will make themselves true [David]
15647 Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
18362 Examples show that truth-making is just non-symmetric, not asymmetric [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
18360 It is assumed that a proposition is necessarily true if its truth-maker exists [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18358 Two different propositions can have the same fact as truth-maker [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
18355 What matters is truth-making (not truth-makers) [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
18354 Correspondence is symmetric, while truth-making is taken to be asymmetric [David]
18356 Correspondence is an over-ambitious attempt to explain truth-making [David]
18363 Correspondence theorists see facts as the only truth-makers [David]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
18364 Correspondence theory likes ideal languages, that reveal the structure of propositions [David]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
18357 What makes a disjunction true is simpler than the disjunctive fact it names [David]
18359 One proposition can be made true by many different facts [David]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
15649 In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
15655 Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
15654 If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
15650 Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
15648 Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
15656 Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
15657 To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
15652 We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
15651 Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
18361 A reflexive relation entails that the relation can't be asymmetric [David]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
19896 It is not a law if not endorsed by the public [Hooker,R]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / b. Rule of law
19891 Rule of law is superior to autonomy, because citizens can see what is expected [Hooker,R]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
19897 Human laws must accord with the general laws of Nature [Hooker,R]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
17005 Natural things observe certain laws, and things cannot do otherwise if they retain their forms [Hooker,R]