Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)', 'Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity' and 'Modal Logic'

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21 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
15647 Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
15649 In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
15655 Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
15654 If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
15650 Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
15648 Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
15656 Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / b. System K
14970 Normal system K has five axioms and rules [Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / c. System D
14971 D is valid on every serial frame, but not where there are dead ends [Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
14972 S4 has 14 modalities, and always reduces to a maximum of three modal operators [Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
14973 In S5 all the long complex modalities reduce to just three, and their negations [Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
14976 Reject the Barcan if quantifiers are confined to worlds, and different things exist in other worlds [Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
15657 To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
15652 We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
15651 Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
14974 A relation is 'Euclidean' if aRb and aRc imply bRc [Cresswell]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14975 A de dicto necessity is true in all worlds, but not necessarily of the same thing in each world [Cresswell]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
19896 It is not a law if not endorsed by the public [Hooker,R]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / b. Rule of law
19891 Rule of law is superior to autonomy, because citizens can see what is expected [Hooker,R]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
19897 Human laws must accord with the general laws of Nature [Hooker,R]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
17005 Natural things observe certain laws, and things cannot do otherwise if they retain their forms [Hooker,R]