Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)', 'The Logical Structure of the World (Aufbau)' and 'In Defence of Pure Reason'

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27 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophy is a priori if it is anything [Bonjour]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
Perceiving necessary connections is the essence of reasoning [Bonjour]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Coherence can't be validated by appeal to coherence [Bonjour]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
The concept of possibility is prior to that of necessity [Bonjour]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Moderate rationalists believe in fallible a priori justification [Bonjour]
Our rules of thought can only be judged by pure rational insight [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
A priori justification requires understanding but no experience [Bonjour]
You can't explain away a priori justification as analyticity, and you can't totally give it up [Bonjour]
A priori justification can vary in degree [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
The induction problem blocks any attempted proof of physical statements [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
Externalism means we have no reason to believe, which is strong scepticism [Bonjour]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Carnap tried to define all scientific predicates in terms of primitive relations, using type theory [Carnap, by Button]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
Induction must go beyond the evidence, in order to explain why the evidence occurred [Bonjour]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
All thought represents either properties or indexicals [Bonjour]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / g. Conceptual atomism
All concepts can be derived from a few basics, making possible one science of everything [Carnap, by Brody]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
Indeterminacy of translation is actually indeterminacy of meaning and belief [Bonjour]