Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)', 'A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic' and 'The Nature of Rationality'

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20 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
15647 Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
22664 I do not care if my trivial beliefs are false, and I have no interest in many truths [Nozick]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
22665 Maybe James was depicting the value of truth, and not its nature [Nozick]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
15649 In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
15648 Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
15655 Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
15654 If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
15650 Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
15656 Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
10163 Propositional modal logic has been proved to be complete [Kripke, by Feferman/Feferman]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
10760 With possible worlds, S4 and S5 are sound and complete, but S1-S3 are not even sound [Kripke, by Rossberg]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
16189 The variable domain approach to quantified modal logic invalidates the Barcan Formula [Kripke, by Simchen]
15132 The Barcan formulas fail in models with varying domains [Kripke, by Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
15657 To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
15652 We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
15651 Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
22663 Rationality is normally said to concern either giving reasons, or reliability [Nozick]
22662 In the instrumental view of rationality it only concerns means, and not ends [Nozick]
22666 Is it rational to believe a truth which leads to permanent misery? [Nozick]
22667 Rationality needs some self-consciousness, to also evaluate how we acquired our reasons [Nozick]