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All the ideas for 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)', 'talk' and 'works'

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17 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
In everyday language, truth seems indefinable, inconsistent, and illogical [Tarski]
Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
Tarski thought axiomatic truth was too contingent, and in danger of inconsistencies [Tarski, by Davidson]
Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
There is no clear boundary between the logical and the non-logical [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
Logical consequence is when in any model in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true [Tarski, by Beall/Restall]
Logical consequence: true premises give true conclusions under all interpretations [Tarski, by Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
Tarski improved Hilbert's geometry axioms, and without set-theory [Tarski, by Feferman/Feferman]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
If everyone is treated with equal injustice, at least that is fair [Morgenbesser]