Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)', 'Inexpressible Properties and Propositions' and 'The Logic of Decision'

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16 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
15647 Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
15649 In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
15648 Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
15655 Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
15654 If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
15650 Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
15656 Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
17990 Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English [Hofweber]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
15657 To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
15652 We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
15651 Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
17988 Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects [Hofweber]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
17989 Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them [Hofweber]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
16285 A possible world can be seen as a complete and consistent novel [Jeffrey]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
19155 Instead of gambling, Jeffrey made the objects of Bayesian preference to be propositions [Jeffrey, by Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
17991 Holism says language can't be translated; the expressibility hypothesis says everything can [Hofweber]