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All the ideas for 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)', 'What is it like to be a bat?' and 'Vagueness: a global approach'

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25 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
15647 Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
15649 In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
15655 Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
15654 If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
15650 Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
15648 Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
15656 Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
15657 To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
23548 Indeterminacy is in conflict with classical logic [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
15652 We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
15651 Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
23539 Classical semantics has referents for names, extensions for predicates, and T or F for sentences [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / a. Problem of vagueness
23544 Local indeterminacy concerns a single object, and global indeterminacy covers a range [Fine,K]
23540 Conjoining two indefinites by related sentences seems to produce a contradiction [Fine,K]
23546 Standardly vagueness involves borderline cases, and a higher standpoint from which they can be seen [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
23542 Identifying vagueness with ignorance is the common mistake of confusing symptoms with cause [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
23541 Supervaluation can give no answer to 'who is the last bald man' [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
23545 We do not have an intelligible concept of a borderline case [Fine,K]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
3286 An organism is conscious if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism [Nagel]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
23547 It seems absurd that there is no identity of any kind between two objects which involve survival [Fine,K]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
3288 Can we describe our experiences to zombies? [Nagel]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
4883 Nagel's title creates an impenetrable mystery, by ignoring a bat's ways that may not be "like" anything [Dennett on Nagel]
3287 We can't be objective about experience [Nagel]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / d. Explanatory gap
4989 Physicalism should explain how subjective experience is possible, but not 'what it is like' [Kirk,R on Nagel]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
23543 We identify laws with regularities because we mistakenly identify causes with their symptoms [Fine,K]