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All the ideas for 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)', 'fragments/reports' and 'The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics'

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29 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws [Russell]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it [Russell]
The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once [Russell]
Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain [Russell, by Robinson,H]
Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science [Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari]
Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics [Russell]
Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do [Russell]
Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / c. Unperceived sense-data
We do not know whether sense-data exist as objects when they are not data [Russell]
'Sensibilia' are identical to sense-data, without actually being data for any mind [Russell]
Ungiven sense-data can no more exist than unmarried husbands [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to [Russell]
Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
Matter is the limit of appearances as distance from the object diminishes [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
There is 'private space', and there is also the 'space of perspectives' [Russell]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 3. Deism
Clearly the gods ignore human affairs, or they would have given us justice [Thrasymachus]