19 ideas
15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
6299 | Axioms are often affirmed simply because they produce results which have been accepted [Resnik] |
15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
6304 | Mathematical realism says that maths exists, is largely true, and is independent of proofs [Resnik] |
6300 | Mathematical constants and quantifiers only exist as locations within structures or patterns [Resnik] |
6303 | Sets are positions in patterns [Resnik] |
6295 | There are too many mathematical objects for them all to be mental or physical [Resnik] |
6296 | Maths is pattern recognition and representation, and its truth and proofs are based on these [Resnik] |
6301 | Congruence is the strongest relationship of patterns, equivalence comes next, and mutual occurrence is the weakest [Resnik] |
6302 | Structuralism must explain why a triangle is a whole, and not a random set of points [Resnik] |
5064 | Rights are moral significance, or liberty, or right not to be restrained, or entitlement [Mawson] |