49 ideas
2319 | Metaphysics is the clarification of the ontological relationships between different areas of thought [Kim] |
15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
17536 | If it can't be expressed mathematically, it can't occur in nature? [Heisenberg] |
2317 | Reductionism is good on light, genes, temperature and transparency [Kim, by PG] |
2310 | Supervenience is linked to dependence [Kim] |
2315 | Mereological supervenience says wholes are fixed by parts [Kim] |
17545 | Quantum theory shows that exact science does not need dogmatic realism [Heisenberg] |
2329 | Causal power is a good way of distinguishing the real from the unreal [Kim] |
17538 | Quantum theory does not introduce minds into atomic events [Heisenberg] |
2320 | Properties can have causal powers lacked by their constituents [Kim] |
17534 | A 'probability wave' is a quantitative version of Aristotle's potential, a mid-way type of reality [Heisenberg] |
17553 | We can retain the idea of 'substance', as indestructible mass or energy [Heisenberg] |
17544 | Basic particles have a mathematical form, which is more important than their substance [Heisenberg] |
530 | There are two contradictory arguments about everything [Kim] |
13314 | Protagoras says arguments on both sides are always equal [Kim, by Seneca] |
2065 | Not every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people [Plato on Kim] |
1550 | Why didn't Protagoras begin by saying "a tadpole is the measure of all things"? [Plato on Kim] |
17550 | We give a mathematical account of a system of natural connections in order to clarify them [Heisenberg] |
2318 | Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes [Kim, by PG] |
2325 | It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality [Kim] |
2324 | Intentionality as function seems possible [Kim] |
2314 | Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't [Kim] |
2313 | Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property [Kim] |
2328 | The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia [Kim] |
2309 | Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience [Kim] |
2311 | Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction [Kim] |
2308 | Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies [Kim] |
2322 | Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time [Kim] |
2327 | Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful [Kim] |
2323 | Emotions have both intentionality and qualia [Kim] |
17549 | Seven theories in science: mechanics, heat, electricity, quantum, particles, relativity, life [Heisenberg, by PG] |
17540 | Energy is that which moves, and is the substance from which everything is made [Heisenberg] |
17541 | Energy is an unchanging substance, having many forms, and causing all change [Heisenberg] |
17548 | Maxwell introduced real fields, which transferred forces from point to point [Heisenberg] |
17533 | Radiation interference needs waves, but radiation photoelectric effects needs particles [Heisenberg] |
17532 | An atom's stability after collisions needs explaining (which Newton's mechanics can't do) [Heisenberg] |
17537 | Position is complementary to velocity or momentum, so the whole system is indeterminate [Heisenberg] |
17551 | It was formerly assumed that electromagnetic waves could not be a reality in themselves [Heisenberg] |
17543 | So-called 'empty' space is the carrier of geometry and kinematics [Heisenberg] |
17552 | In relativity the length of the 'present moment' is relative to distance from the observer [Heisenberg] |