Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)', 'Epistemology Naturalized' and 'Significance of the Kripkean Nec A Posteriori'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

24 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / c. Modern philosophy mid-period
13966 Analytic philosophy loved the necessary a priori analytic, linguistic modality, and rigour [Soames]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
13974 If philosophy is analysis of meaning, available to all competent speakers, what's left for philosophers? [Soames]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
15647 Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
15649 In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
15655 Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
15654 If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
15650 Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
15648 Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
15656 Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
15657 To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
15652 We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
15651 Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
1635 Mathematics reduces to set theory (which is a bit vague and unobvious), but not to logic proper [Quine]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13969 Kripkean essential properties and relations are necessary, in all genuinely possible worlds [Soames]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
13973 A key achievement of Kripke is showing that important modalities are not linguistic in source [Soames]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
13968 Kripkean possible worlds are abstract maximal states in which the real world could have been [Soames]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 9. Naturalised Epistemology
7627 You can't reduce epistemology to psychology, because that presupposes epistemology [Maund on Quine]
8871 We should abandon a search for justification or foundations, and focus on how knowledge is acquired [Quine, by Davidson]
8826 If we abandon justification and normativity in epistemology, we must also abandon knowledge [Kim on Quine]
8827 Without normativity, naturalized epistemology isn't even about beliefs [Kim on Quine]
8899 Epistemology is a part of psychology, studying how our theories relate to our evidence [Quine]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
8898 Inculcations of meanings of words rests ultimately on sensory evidence [Quine]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
13972 Two-dimensionalism reinstates descriptivism, and reconnects necessity and apriority to analyticity [Soames]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
8900 In observation sentences, we could substitute community acceptance for analyticity [Quine]