Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Rationality of Science', 'Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism' and 'Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories''

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26 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 3. Earlier European Philosophy / b. Early medieval philosophy
16137 Earlier views of Aristotle were dominated by 'Categories' [Frede,M]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
3859 We do not wish merely to predict, we also want to explain [Newton-Smith]
3870 The real problem of science is how to choose between possible explanations [Newton-Smith]
3853 For science to be rational, we must explain scientific change rationally [Newton-Smith]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 2. Positivism
3855 Critics attack positivist division between theory and observation [Newton-Smith]
3854 Positivists hold that theoretical terms change, but observation terms don't [Newton-Smith]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
3869 More truthful theories have greater predictive power [Newton-Smith]
3861 Theories generate infinite truths and falsehoods, so they cannot be used to assess probability [Newton-Smith]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
14775 Numbers are just names devised for counting [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
14776 That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact [Peirce]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
3867 De re necessity arises from the way the world is [Newton-Smith]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
3872 We must assess the truth of beliefs in identifying them [Newton-Smith]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
14770 Reasoning is based on statistical induction, so it can't achieve certainty or precision [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
14774 Innate truths are very uncertain and full of error, so they certainly have exceptions [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 3. Inspiration
14773 A truth is hard for us to understand if it rests on nothing but inspiration [Peirce]
14772 If we decide an idea is inspired, we still can't be sure we have got the idea right [Peirce]
14771 Only reason can establish whether some deliverance of revelation really is inspired [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
3857 Defeat relativism by emphasising truth and reference, not meaning [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
3858 A full understanding of 'yellow' involves some theory [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 5. Anomalies
3862 All theories contain anomalies, and so are falsified! [Newton-Smith]
3863 The anomaly of Uranus didn't destroy Newton's mechanics - it led to Neptune's discovery [Newton-Smith]
3864 Anomalies are judged against rival theories, and support for the current theory [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
3865 Why should it matter whether or not a theory is scientific? [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
3866 If theories are really incommensurable, we could believe them all [Newton-Smith]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
14769 Only imagination can connect phenomena together in a rational way [Peirce]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
3871 Explaining an action is showing that it is rational [Newton-Smith]