46 ideas
| 3853 | For science to be rational, we must explain scientific change rationally [Newton-Smith] |
| 3859 | We do not wish merely to predict, we also want to explain [Newton-Smith] |
| 3870 | The real problem of science is how to choose between possible explanations [Newton-Smith] |
| 3855 | Critics attack positivist division between theory and observation [Newton-Smith] |
| 3854 | Positivists hold that theoretical terms change, but observation terms don't [Newton-Smith] |
| 4036 | What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities [Armstrong, by Mellor/Oliver] |
| 13886 | Later Frege held that definitions must fix a function's value for every possible argument [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 9845 | We can't define a word by defining an expression containing it, as the remaining parts are a problem [Frege] |
| 10019 | Only what is logically complex can be defined; what is simple must be pointed to [Frege] |
| 3869 | More truthful theories have greater predictive power [Newton-Smith] |
| 3861 | Theories generate infinite truths and falsehoods, so they cannot be used to assess probability [Newton-Smith] |
| 9886 | Cardinals say how many, and reals give measurements compared to a unit quantity [Frege] |
| 9889 | Real numbers are ratios of quantities [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 10553 | A number is a class of classes of the same cardinality [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 10020 | Frege's biggest error is in not accounting for the senses of number terms [Hodes on Frege] |
| 9887 | Formalism misunderstands applications, metatheory, and infinity [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 8751 | Only applicability raises arithmetic from a game to a science [Frege] |
| 15754 | Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
| 4034 | Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature [Armstrong] |
| 8535 | To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate [Armstrong] |
| 8537 | Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive [Armstrong] |
| 8538 | Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact [Armstrong] |
| 8539 | Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
| 8529 | Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes [Armstrong] |
| 8532 | Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties [Armstrong] |
| 8530 | Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold' [Armstrong] |
| 8536 | We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates [Armstrong] |
| 8531 | In most sets there is no property common to all the members [Armstrong] |
| 9891 | The first demand of logic is of a sharp boundary [Frege] |
| 15753 | Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined [Armstrong] |
| 3867 | De re necessity arises from the way the world is [Newton-Smith] |
| 3872 | We must assess the truth of beliefs in identifying them [Newton-Smith] |
| 3857 | Defeat relativism by emphasising truth and reference, not meaning [Newton-Smith] |
| 3858 | A full understanding of 'yellow' involves some theory [Newton-Smith] |
| 3862 | All theories contain anomalies, and so are falsified! [Newton-Smith] |
| 3863 | The anomaly of Uranus didn't destroy Newton's mechanics - it led to Neptune's discovery [Newton-Smith] |
| 3864 | Anomalies are judged against rival theories, and support for the current theory [Newton-Smith] |
| 3865 | Why should it matter whether or not a theory is scientific? [Newton-Smith] |
| 3866 | If theories are really incommensurable, we could believe them all [Newton-Smith] |
| 9890 | The modern account of real numbers detaches a ratio from its geometrical origins [Frege] |
| 11846 | If we abstract the difference between two houses, they don't become the same house [Frege] |
| 8533 | Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply [Armstrong] |
| 4035 | There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects [Armstrong] |
| 3871 | Explaining an action is showing that it is rational [Newton-Smith] |
| 8541 | Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability [Armstrong] |
| 8540 | The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue' [Armstrong] |