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All the ideas for 'The Rationality of Science', 'talk' and 'Review of Husserl's 'Phil of Arithmetic''

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35 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
For science to be rational, we must explain scientific change rationally [Newton-Smith]
We do not wish merely to predict, we also want to explain [Newton-Smith]
The real problem of science is how to choose between possible explanations [Newton-Smith]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 2. Positivism
Critics attack positivist division between theory and observation [Newton-Smith]
Positivists hold that theoretical terms change, but observation terms don't [Newton-Smith]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
A definition need not capture the sense of an expression - just get the reference right [Frege, by Dummett]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
More truthful theories have greater predictive power [Newton-Smith]
Theories generate infinite truths and falsehoods, so they cannot be used to assess probability [Newton-Smith]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
Since every definition is an equation, one cannot define equality itself [Frege]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / e. Counting by correlation
Counting rests on one-one correspondence, of numerals to objects [Frege]
Husserl rests sameness of number on one-one correlation, forgetting the correlation with numbers themselves [Frege]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
In a number-statement, something is predicated of a concept [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Our concepts recognise existing relations, they don't change them [Frege]
Numbers are not real like the sea, but (crucially) they are still objective [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
The naïve view of number is that it is like a heap of things, or maybe a property of a heap [Frege]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
If objects are just presentation, we get increasing abstraction by ignoring their properties [Frege]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
A prior understanding of beauty is needed to assert that the Form of the Beautiful is beautiful [Westaway]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
At what point does an object become 'whole'? [Westaway]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
De re necessity arises from the way the world is [Newton-Smith]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
We must assess the truth of beliefs in identifying them [Newton-Smith]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Defeat relativism by emphasising truth and reference, not meaning [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
A full understanding of 'yellow' involves some theory [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 5. Anomalies
All theories contain anomalies, and so are falsified! [Newton-Smith]
The anomaly of Uranus didn't destroy Newton's mechanics - it led to Neptune's discovery [Newton-Smith]
Anomalies are judged against rival theories, and support for the current theory [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Why should it matter whether or not a theory is scientific? [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
If theories are really incommensurable, we could believe them all [Newton-Smith]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
The Chinese Room should be able to ask itself questions in Mandarin [Westaway]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Many people have the same thought, which is the component, not the private presentation [Frege]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
Disregarding properties of two cats still leaves different objects, but what is now the difference? [Frege]
How do you find the right level of inattention; you eliminate too many or too few characteristics [Frege]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
Number-abstraction somehow makes things identical without changing them! [Frege]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
Psychological logicians are concerned with sense of words, but mathematicians study the reference [Frege]
Identity baffles psychologists, since A and B must be presented differently to identify them [Frege]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Explaining an action is showing that it is rational [Newton-Smith]