41 ideas
17275 | Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things [Fine,K] |
3870 | The real problem of science is how to choose between possible explanations [Newton-Smith] |
3859 | We do not wish merely to predict, we also want to explain [Newton-Smith] |
3853 | For science to be rational, we must explain scientific change rationally [Newton-Smith] |
3854 | Positivists hold that theoretical terms change, but observation terms don't [Newton-Smith] |
3855 | Critics attack positivist division between theory and observation [Newton-Smith] |
3869 | More truthful theories have greater predictive power [Newton-Smith] |
3861 | Theories generate infinite truths and falsehoods, so they cannot be used to assess probability [Newton-Smith] |
17282 | Truths need not always have their source in what exists [Fine,K] |
17283 | If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything [Fine,K] |
17286 | Logical consequence is verification by a possible world within a truth-set [Fine,K] |
17272 | 2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing [Fine,K] |
17276 | If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality [Fine,K] |
17284 | An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy [Fine,K] |
17285 | 'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways [Fine,K] |
17288 | We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding [Fine,K] |
17281 | If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts [Fine,K] |
17280 | Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates [Fine,K] |
17290 | Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence [Fine,K] |
17274 | Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science) [Fine,K] |
17278 | We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground [Fine,K] |
17287 | Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact [Fine,K] |
6900 | A prior understanding of beauty is needed to assert that the Form of the Beautiful is beautiful [Westaway] |
6956 | At what point does an object become 'whole'? [Westaway] |
17279 | Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking [Fine,K] |
17273 | Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation [Fine,K] |
3867 | De re necessity arises from the way the world is [Newton-Smith] |
17289 | Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something [Fine,K] |
3872 | We must assess the truth of beliefs in identifying them [Newton-Smith] |
3857 | Defeat relativism by emphasising truth and reference, not meaning [Newton-Smith] |
3858 | A full understanding of 'yellow' involves some theory [Newton-Smith] |
3862 | All theories contain anomalies, and so are falsified! [Newton-Smith] |
3863 | The anomaly of Uranus didn't destroy Newton's mechanics - it led to Neptune's discovery [Newton-Smith] |
3864 | Anomalies are judged against rival theories, and support for the current theory [Newton-Smith] |
3865 | Why should it matter whether or not a theory is scientific? [Newton-Smith] |
3866 | If theories are really incommensurable, we could believe them all [Newton-Smith] |
17291 | We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are) [Fine,K] |
17271 | Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination? [Fine,K] |
7335 | The Chinese Room should be able to ask itself questions in Mandarin [Westaway] |
17277 | If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa) [Fine,K] |
3871 | Explaining an action is showing that it is rational [Newton-Smith] |