Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Rationality of Science', 'Aristotle on Substance' and 'Psychosemantics'

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47 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
We do not wish merely to predict, we also want to explain [Newton-Smith]
The real problem of science is how to choose between possible explanations [Newton-Smith]
For science to be rational, we must explain scientific change rationally [Newton-Smith]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 2. Positivism
Positivists hold that theoretical terms change, but observation terms don't [Newton-Smith]
Critics attack positivist division between theory and observation [Newton-Smith]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
Theories generate infinite truths and falsehoods, so they cannot be used to assess probability [Newton-Smith]
More truthful theories have greater predictive power [Newton-Smith]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
'Jocasta' needs to be distinguished from 'Oedipus's mother' because they are connected by different properties [Fodor]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
A particle and a coin heads-or-tails pick out to perfectly well-defined predicates and properties [Fodor]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
Aristotelian matter seriously threatens the intrinsic unity and substantiality of its object [Gill,ML]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
De re necessity arises from the way the world is [Newton-Smith]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
We must assess the truth of beliefs in identifying them [Newton-Smith]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
Contrary to commonsense, most of what is in the mind seems to be unlearned [Fodor]
Evolution suggests that innate knowledge of human psychology would be beneficial [Fodor]
Sticklebacks have an innate idea that red things are rivals [Fodor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Defeat relativism by emphasising truth and reference, not meaning [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
A full understanding of 'yellow' involves some theory [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 5. Anomalies
All theories contain anomalies, and so are falsified! [Newton-Smith]
The anomaly of Uranus didn't destroy Newton's mechanics - it led to Neptune's discovery [Newton-Smith]
Anomalies are judged against rival theories, and support for the current theory [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Why should it matter whether or not a theory is scientific? [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
If theories are really incommensurable, we could believe them all [Newton-Smith]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
In CRTT thought may be represented, content must be [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Intentionality doesn't go deep enough to appear on the physicists' ultimate list of things [Fodor]
We can't use propositions to explain intentional attitudes, because they would need explaining [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Behaviourism has no theory of mental causation [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
Any piece of software can always be hard-wired [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
Causal powers must be a crucial feature of mental states [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 6. Homuncular Functionalism
Mind is a set of hierarchical 'homunculi', which are made up in turn from subcomponents [Fodor, by Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Supervenience gives good support for mental causation [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Hume's associationism offers no explanation at all of rational thought [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
If mind is just physical, how can it follow the rules required for intelligent thought? [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
We may be able to explain rationality mechanically [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology is the only explanation of behaviour we have [Fodor]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Belief and desire are structured states, which need mentalese [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
Obsession with narrow content leads to various sorts of hopeless anti-realism [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
Do identical thoughts have identical causal roles? [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
Grice thinks meaning is inherited from the propositional attitudes which sentences express [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Whatever in the mind delivers falsehood is parasitic on what delivers truth [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Many different verification procedures can reach 'star', but it only has one semantic value [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
The meaning of a sentence derives from its use in expressing an attitude [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
Meaning holism is a crazy doctrine [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
Very different mental states can share their contents, so content doesn't seem to be constructed from functional role [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
Mental states may have the same content but different extensions [Fodor]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Explaining an action is showing that it is rational [Newton-Smith]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter
Prime matter has no place in Aristotle's theories, and passages claiming it are misread [Gill,ML]
Prime matter is actually nothing and potentially everything (or potentially an element) [Gill,ML]