39 ideas
3859 | We do not wish merely to predict, we also want to explain [Newton-Smith] |
3870 | The real problem of science is how to choose between possible explanations [Newton-Smith] |
3853 | For science to be rational, we must explain scientific change rationally [Newton-Smith] |
3855 | Critics attack positivist division between theory and observation [Newton-Smith] |
3854 | Positivists hold that theoretical terms change, but observation terms don't [Newton-Smith] |
3869 | More truthful theories have greater predictive power [Newton-Smith] |
3861 | Theories generate infinite truths and falsehoods, so they cannot be used to assess probability [Newton-Smith] |
17377 | All descriptive language is classificatory [Dupré] |
17376 | We should aim for a classification which tells us as much as possible about the object [Dupré] |
3626 | Knowing the attributes is enough to reveal a substance [Descartes] |
17390 | Natural kinds don't need essentialism to be explanatory [Dupré] |
17389 | A species might have its essential genetic mechanism replaced by a new one [Dupré] |
17388 | It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds [Dupré] |
3867 | De re necessity arises from the way the world is [Newton-Smith] |
3872 | We must assess the truth of beliefs in identifying them [Newton-Smith] |
3630 | Our thinking about external things doesn't disprove the existence of innate ideas [Descartes] |
3857 | Defeat relativism by emphasising truth and reference, not meaning [Newton-Smith] |
3858 | A full understanding of 'yellow' involves some theory [Newton-Smith] |
17374 | The possibility of prediction rests on determinism [Dupré] |
3862 | All theories contain anomalies, and so are falsified! [Newton-Smith] |
3863 | The anomaly of Uranus didn't destroy Newton's mechanics - it led to Neptune's discovery [Newton-Smith] |
3864 | Anomalies are judged against rival theories, and support for the current theory [Newton-Smith] |
3865 | Why should it matter whether or not a theory is scientific? [Newton-Smith] |
3866 | If theories are really incommensurable, we could believe them all [Newton-Smith] |
17378 | Presumably molecular structure seems important because we never have the Twin Earth experience [Dupré] |
3631 | A blind man may still contain the idea of colour [Descartes] |
3871 | Explaining an action is showing that it is rational [Newton-Smith] |
17381 | Phylogenetics involves history, and cladism rests species on splits in lineage [Dupré] |
17385 | Kinds don't do anything (including evolve) because they are abstract [Dupré] |
17375 | Natural kinds are decided entirely by the intentions of our classification [Dupré] |
17379 | Borders between species are much less clear in vegetables than among animals [Dupré] |
17384 | Even atoms of an element differ, in the energy levels of their electrons [Dupré] |
17387 | Ecologists favour classifying by niche, even though that can clash with genealogy [Dupré] |
17382 | Cooks, unlike scientists, distinguish garlic from onions [Dupré] |
17380 | Wales may count as fish [Dupré] |
17383 | Species are the lowest-level classification in biology [Dupré] |
17386 | The theory of evolution is mainly about species [Dupré] |
3639 | Necessary existence is a property which is uniquely part of God's essence [Descartes] |
3640 | Possible existence is a perfection in the idea of a triangle [Descartes] |