Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Rationality of Science', 'What Price Bivalence?' and 'Deflating Existential Consequence'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


31 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
For science to be rational, we must explain scientific change rationally [Newton-Smith]
We do not wish merely to predict, we also want to explain [Newton-Smith]
The real problem of science is how to choose between possible explanations [Newton-Smith]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 2. Positivism
Critics attack positivist division between theory and observation [Newton-Smith]
Positivists hold that theoretical terms change, but observation terms don't [Newton-Smith]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
More truthful theories have greater predictive power [Newton-Smith]
Theories generate infinite truths and falsehoods, so they cannot be used to assess probability [Newton-Smith]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' is true without a truthmaker [Azzouni]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
Truth is dispensable, by replacing truth claims with the sentence itself [Azzouni]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Truth lets us assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit [Azzouni]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
Bivalence applies not just to sentences, but that general terms are true or false of each object [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
Names function the same way, even if there is no object [Azzouni]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
That all existents have causal powers is unknowable; the claim is simply an epistemic one [Azzouni]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
If fictional objects really don't exist, then they aren't abstract objects [Azzouni]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
Terms learned by ostension tend to be vague, because that must be quick and unrefined [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
Modern metaphysics often derives ontology from the logical forms of sentences [Azzouni]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
If objectual quantifiers ontologically commit, so does the metalanguage for its semantics [Azzouni]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
In the vernacular there is no unequivocal ontological commitment [Azzouni]
We only get ontology from semantics if we have already smuggled it in [Azzouni]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Things that don't exist don't have any properties [Azzouni]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
De re necessity arises from the way the world is [Newton-Smith]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
We must assess the truth of beliefs in identifying them [Newton-Smith]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Defeat relativism by emphasising truth and reference, not meaning [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
A full understanding of 'yellow' involves some theory [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 5. Anomalies
All theories contain anomalies, and so are falsified! [Newton-Smith]
The anomaly of Uranus didn't destroy Newton's mechanics - it led to Neptune's discovery [Newton-Smith]
Anomalies are judged against rival theories, and support for the current theory [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Why should it matter whether or not a theory is scientific? [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
If theories are really incommensurable, we could believe them all [Newton-Smith]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Explaining an action is showing that it is rational [Newton-Smith]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 3. Periodic Table
The periodic table not only defines the elements, but also excludes other possible elements [Azzouni]