Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Rationality of Science', 'On the Nature of Moral Values' and 'Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics'

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51 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is (supposedly) first the ontology, then in general what things are like [Hofweber]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
'Fundamentality' is either a superficial idea, or much too obscure [Hofweber]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
For science to be rational, we must explain scientific change rationally [Newton-Smith]
The real problem of science is how to choose between possible explanations [Newton-Smith]
We do not wish merely to predict, we also want to explain [Newton-Smith]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 2. Positivism
Positivists hold that theoretical terms change, but observation terms don't [Newton-Smith]
Critics attack positivist division between theory and observation [Newton-Smith]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
Theories generate infinite truths and falsehoods, so they cannot be used to assess probability [Newton-Smith]
More truthful theories have greater predictive power [Newton-Smith]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Science is sympathetic to truth as correspondence, since it depends on observation [Quine]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
'It's true that Fido is a dog' conjures up a contrast class, of 'it's false' or 'it's unlikely' [Hofweber]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Since properties can have properties, some theorists rank them in 'types' [Hofweber]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer [Hofweber]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
'Singular terms' are not found in modern linguistics, and are not the same as noun phrases [Hofweber]
If two processes are said to be identical, that doesn't make their terms refer to entities [Hofweber]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
The inferential quantifier focuses on truth; the domain quantifier focuses on reality [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
Numbers are used as singular terms, as adjectives, and as symbols [Hofweber]
The Amazonian Piraha language is said to have no number words [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
The fundamental theorem of arithmetic is that all numbers are composed uniquely of primes [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
How can words be used for counting if they are objects? [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Logicism makes sense of our ability to know arithmetic just by thought [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
Neo-Fregeans are dazzled by a technical result, and ignore practicalities [Hofweber]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Supervenience offers little explanation for things which necessarily go together [Hofweber]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Reality can be seen as the totality of facts, or as the totality of things [Hofweber]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
There are probably ineffable facts, systematically hidden from us [Hofweber]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Our perceptual beliefs are about ordinary objects, not about simples arranged chair-wise [Hofweber]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Counterfactuals are essential for planning, and learning from mistakes [Hofweber]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
De re necessity arises from the way the world is [Newton-Smith]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
We must assess the truth of beliefs in identifying them [Newton-Smith]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Defeat relativism by emphasising truth and reference, not meaning [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
A full understanding of 'yellow' involves some theory [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 5. Anomalies
All theories contain anomalies, and so are falsified! [Newton-Smith]
The anomaly of Uranus didn't destroy Newton's mechanics - it led to Neptune's discovery [Newton-Smith]
Anomalies are judged against rival theories, and support for the current theory [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Why should it matter whether or not a theory is scientific? [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
If theories are really incommensurable, we could believe them all [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
More careful inductions gradually lead to the hypothetico-deductive method [Quine]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
The "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning says every expression in a language has a referent [Hofweber]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
Inferential role semantics is an alternative to semantics that connects to the world [Hofweber]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
Syntactic form concerns the focus of the sentence, as well as the truth-conditions [Hofweber]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Properties can be expressed in a language despite the absence of a single word for them [Hofweber]
'Being taller than this' is a predicate which can express many different properties [Hofweber]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Compositonality is a way to build up the truth-conditions of a sentence [Hofweber]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Proposition have no content, because they are content [Hofweber]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
Without propositions there can be no beliefs or desires [Hofweber]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking? [Hofweber]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
'Semantic type coercion' is selecting the reading of a word to make the best sense [Hofweber]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
'Background deletion' is appropriately omitting background from an answer [Hofweber]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Explaining an action is showing that it is rational [Newton-Smith]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Altruistic values concern other persons, and ceremonial values concern practices [Quine]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love seems to diminish with distance from oneself [Quine]