36 ideas
4739 | In "if and only if" (iff), "if" expresses the sufficient condition, and "only if" the necessary condition [Engel] |
21021 | Keep premises as weak as possible, to avoid controversial difficulties [Nussbaum] |
4737 | Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances? [Engel] |
4750 | The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p' [Engel] |
4744 | We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts [Engel] |
4738 | The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers [Engel] |
4745 | Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs [Engel] |
4753 | Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions [Engel] |
4755 | Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons [Engel] |
4751 | Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic [Engel] |
4752 | Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p') [Engel] |
16674 | The quantity is just the matter, in that it has extended parts and is diffuse [Charleton] |
4762 | The Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs may be motivators as well as desires [Engel] |
4754 | Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires [Engel] |
4763 | 'Evidentialists' say, and 'voluntarists' deny, that we only believe on the basis of evidence [Engel] |
4746 | Pragmatism is better understood as a theory of belief than as a theory of truth [Engel] |
4764 | We cannot directly control our beliefs, but we can control the causes of our involuntary beliefs [Engel] |
4759 | Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties [Engel] |
21007 | Storytelling is never neutral; some features of the world must be emphasised [Nussbaum] |
21025 | Particularism gives no guidance for the future [Nussbaum] |
21026 | Compassion is unreliable, because it favours people close to us [Nussbaum] |
21019 | Social contracts assume equal powers among the participants [Nussbaum] |
21011 | We shouldn't focus on actual preferences, which may be distorted by injustices [Nussbaum] |
21008 | Liberalism does not need a comprehensive account of value [Nussbaum] |
21012 | Women are often treated like children, and not respected for their choices [Nussbaum] |
21015 | Negative liberty is incoherent; all liberties, to do and to be, require the prevention of interference [Nussbaum] |
21017 | Political freedom is an incoherent project, because some freedoms limit other freedoms [Nussbaum] |
21016 | Political and civil rights are not separate from economic and social rights [Nussbaum] |
21009 | Capabilities: Life, Health, Safety, Mental life, Love, Planning, Joining in, Nature, Play, Control [Nussbaum, by PG] |
21010 | Justice requires that the ten main capabilities of people are reasonably enabled [Nussbaum] |
21013 | Capabilities are grounded in bare humanity and agency; qualifying as rational is not needed [Nussbaum] |
21014 | Rights are not just barriers against state interference; governments must affirm capabilities of citizens [Nussbaum] |
21020 | Any establishment belief system is incompatible with full respect for all citizens [Nussbaum] |
21023 | We should respect animals in the way that we respect the animal nature in humans [Nussbaum] |
21024 | It may be no harm to kill an animal which cannot plan for its future [Nussbaum] |
21022 | The Capabilities Approach sees animals as agents, not just as having feelings [Nussbaum] |