Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causality: Production and Propagation', 'On the Notion of Cause' and 'The Meaning of the Word'

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12 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Philosophers usually learn science from each other, not from science [Russell]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
You can only define a statement that something is 'true' by referring to its functional possibilities [James]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
If the hypothesis of God is widely successful, it is true [James]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
'Necessary' is a predicate of a propositional function, saying it is true for all values of its argument [Russell]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
A causal interaction is when two processes intersect, and correlated modifications persist afterwards [Salmon]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
Cause must come first in propagations of causal interactions, but interactions are simultaneous [Salmon]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
The law of causality is a source of confusion, and should be dropped from philosophy [Russell]
If causes are contiguous with events, only the last bit is relevant, or the event's timing is baffling [Russell]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Instead of localised events, I take enduring and extended processes as basic to causation [Salmon]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Striking a match causes its igniting, even if it sometimes doesn't work [Russell]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
In causal laws, 'events' must recur, so they have to be universals, not particulars [Russell]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 6. Laws as Numerical
The constancy of scientific laws rests on differential equations, not on cause and effect [Russell]