Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causality: Production and Propagation', 'To be is to be the value of a variable..' and 'Matters of Mind'

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20 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
7785 The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
10699 Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10225 Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
10736 Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
10780 Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
10697 Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
13671 Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
10267 We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
10698 Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
7806 Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
10700 First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
2534 Mindless bodies are zombies, bodiless minds are ghosts [Sturgeon]
2537 Types are properties, and tokens are events. Are they split between mental and physical, or not? [Sturgeon]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
2532 Intentionality isn't reducible, because of its experiential aspect [Sturgeon]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
2533 Rule-following can't be reduced to the physical [Sturgeon]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
2535 The main argument for physicalism is its simple account of causation [Sturgeon]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
2536 Do facts cause thoughts, or embody them, or what? [Sturgeon]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
8412 A causal interaction is when two processes intersect, and correlated modifications persist afterwards [Salmon]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
8413 Cause must come first in propagations of causal interactions, but interactions are simultaneous [Salmon]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
8411 Instead of localised events, I take enduring and extended processes as basic to causation [Salmon]