14 ideas
| 13168 | My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz] |
| 13169 | I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz] |
| 13170 | The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz] |
| 13171 | Substance must necessarily involve progress and change [Leibniz] |
| 10938 | The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones [Rami] |
| 10940 | An 'individual essence' is possessed uniquely by a particular object [Rami] |
| 10939 | 'Sortal essentialism' says being a particular kind is what is essential [Rami] |
| 10934 | Unlosable properties are not the same as essential properties [Rami] |
| 10933 | Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility [Rami] |
| 10932 | If it is possible 'for all I know' then it is 'epistemically possible' [Rami] |
| 8412 | A causal interaction is when two processes intersect, and correlated modifications persist afterwards [Salmon] |
| 8413 | Cause must come first in propagations of causal interactions, but interactions are simultaneous [Salmon] |
| 8411 | Instead of localised events, I take enduring and extended processes as basic to causation [Salmon] |
| 13167 | We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass [Leibniz] |