15 ideas
| 13195 | To explain a house we must describe its use, as well as its parts [Leibniz] |
| 13193 | Active force is not just potential for action, since it involves a real effort or striving [Leibniz] |
| 9264 | Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
| 9266 | A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
| 9267 | Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt] |
| 9265 | The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt] |
| 20015 | Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 9270 | A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt] |
| 9269 | A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt] |
| 8412 | A causal interaction is when two processes intersect, and correlated modifications persist afterwards [Salmon] |
| 8413 | Cause must come first in propagations of causal interactions, but interactions are simultaneous [Salmon] |
| 8411 | Instead of localised events, I take enduring and extended processes as basic to causation [Salmon] |
| 13194 | God's laws would be meaningless without internal powers for following them [Leibniz] |
| 13196 | All qualities of bodies reduce to forces [Leibniz] |
| 13192 | Power is passive force, which is mass, and active force, which is entelechy or form [Leibniz] |