Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causal Connections', 'Without Immediate Justification' and 'The Theory of Objects'

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12 ideas

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
So-called 'free logic' operates without existence assumptions [Meinong, by George/Van Evra]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
There can be impossible and contradictory objects, if they can have properties [Meinong, by Friend]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
There are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects [Meinong]
Meinong says an object need not exist, but must only have properties [Meinong, by Friend]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Meinong said all objects of thought (even self-contradictions) have some sort of being [Meinong, by Lycan]
The objects of knowledge are far more numerous than objects which exist [Meinong]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Coherentists say that regress problems are assuming 'linear' justification [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
In the context of scepticism, externalism does not seem to be an option [Williams,M]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Salmon says processes rather than events should be basic in a theory of physical causation [Salmon, by Psillos]