11 ideas
| 22153 | Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter] |
| 19463 | Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past [Ayer] |
| 19485 | Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine] |
| 19486 | We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine] |
| 19461 | Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature [Ayer] |
| 19459 | To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory [Ayer] |
| 19460 | 'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless [Ayer] |
| 19464 | We only discard a hypothesis after one failure if it appears likely to keep on failing [Ayer] |
| 19462 | Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively [Ayer] |
| 19487 | Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine] |
| 4784 | Salmon says processes rather than events should be basic in a theory of physical causation [Salmon, by Psillos] |