7 ideas
22153 | Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter] |
19485 | Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine] |
19486 | We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine] |
3570 | Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M] |
2748 | A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J] |
19487 | Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine] |
4784 | Salmon says processes rather than events should be basic in a theory of physical causation [Salmon, by Psillos] |