10 ideas
22153 | Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter] |
12219 | Whether a modal claim is true depends on how the object is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
10922 | Objects are the values of variables, so a referentially opaque context cannot be quantified into [Quine] |
19485 | Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine] |
19486 | We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine] |
10923 | Aristotelian essentialism says a thing has some necessary and some non-necessary properties [Quine] |
10921 | Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences [Quine] |
10924 | Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves [Quine] |
19487 | Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine] |
4784 | Salmon says processes rather than events should be basic in a theory of physical causation [Salmon, by Psillos] |