Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation?', 'Comment on Armstrong and Forrest' and 'The Making of a Philosopher'

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7 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
15453 The main rivals to universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
15452 We could not uphold a truthmaker for 'Fa' without structures [Lewis]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
8793 If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
8792 Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what [Sellars]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
4691 If all mental life were conscious, we would be unable to see things, or to process speech [McGinn]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
8791 The concept of 'green' involves a battery of other concepts [Sellars]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
4690 If meaning is speaker's intentions, it can be reduced to propositional attitudes, and philosophy of mind [McGinn]