Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation?', 'Should a materialist believe in qualia?' and 'The Structure of Appearance'

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10 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
Classes are a host of ethereal, platonic, pseudo entities [Goodman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Two objects can apparently make up quite distinct arrangements in sets [Goodman, by Burgess/Rosen]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
The counties of Utah, and the state, and its acres, are in no way different [Goodman]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
If all and only red things were round things, we would need to specify the 'respect' of the resemblance [Goodman, by Macdonald,C]
Without respects of resemblance, we would collect blue book, blue pen, red pen, red clock together [Goodman, by Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
If we apply the same word to different things, it is only because we are willing to do so [Goodman, by Macdonald,C]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what [Sellars]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Part of the folk concept of qualia is what makes recognition and comparison possible [Lewis]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
The concept of 'green' involves a battery of other concepts [Sellars]