Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation?', 'Introduction to 'Causation'' and 'Modal Logics and Philosophy'

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24 ideas

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
Propositional logic handles negation, disjunction, conjunction; predicate logic adds quantifiers, predicates, relations [Girle]
There are three axiom schemas for propositional logic [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / a. Symbols of PL
Proposition logic has definitions for its three operators: or, and, and identical [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
Axiom systems of logic contain axioms, inference rules, and definitions of proof and theorems [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
There are seven modalities in S4, each with its negation [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
◊p → □◊p is the hallmark of S5 [Girle]
S5 has just six modalities, and all strings can be reduced to those [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
Possible worlds logics use true-in-a-world rather than true [Girle]
Modal logic has four basic modal negation equivalences [Girle]
Modal logics were studied in terms of axioms, but now possible worlds semantics is added [Girle]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 7. Strict Implication
Necessary implication is called 'strict implication'; if successful, it is called 'entailment' [Girle]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 5. Tableau Proof
If an argument is invalid, a truth tree will indicate a counter-example [Girle]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Analytic truths are divided into logically and conceptually necessary [Girle]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Possibilities can be logical, theoretical, physical, economic or human [Girle]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
A world has 'access' to a world it generates, which is important in possible worlds semantics [Girle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what [Sellars]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 9. Perceiving Causation
Either causal relations are given in experience, or they are unobserved and theoretical [Sosa/Tooley]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
The concept of 'green' involves a battery of other concepts [Sellars]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
The problem is to explain how causal laws and relations connect, and how they link to the world [Sosa/Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Causation isn't energy transfer, because an electron is caused by previous temporal parts [Sosa/Tooley]
If direction of causation is just direction of energy transfer, that seems to involve causation [Sosa/Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Are causes sufficient for the event, or necessary, or both? [Sosa/Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
The dominant view is that causal laws are prior; a minority say causes can be explained singly [Sosa/Tooley]