14 ideas
14794 | Instead of seeking Truth, we should seek belief that is beyond doubt [Peirce] |
8793 | If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars] |
8792 | Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what [Sellars] |
2590 | Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam] |
2591 | Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam] |
2588 | Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam] |
2589 | Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam] |
2592 | Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam] |
2587 | Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam] |
6376 | Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam] |
2330 | If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim] |
14792 | A 'conception', the rational implication of a word, lies in its bearing upon the conduct of life [Peirce] |
14793 | The definition of a concept is just its experimental implications [Peirce] |
8791 | The concept of 'green' involves a battery of other concepts [Sellars] |