12 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
17644 | Metaphysical realism is committed to there being one ultimate true theory [Putnam] |
17648 | It is an illusion to think there could be one good scientific theory of reality [Putnam] |
17643 | Shape is essential relative to 'statue', but not essential relative to 'clay' [Putnam] |
17642 | The old view that sense data are independent of mind is quite dotty [Putnam] |
8793 | If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars] |
8792 | Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what [Sellars] |
8791 | The concept of 'green' involves a battery of other concepts [Sellars] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
17645 | An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam] |