10 ideas
7301 | The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7302 | Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7303 | If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7299 | Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7300 | An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
22449 | When we say 'is red' we don't mean 'seems red to most people' [Foot] |
7297 | My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
6382 | The 'grain problem' says physical objects are granular, where sensations appear not to be [Sellars, by Polger] |
22451 | All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble [Foot] |
22452 | Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it? [Foot] |