38 ideas
8166 | Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth [Dummett] |
8173 | Language can violate bivalence because of non-referring terms or ill-defined predicates [Dummett] |
8179 | The law of excluded middle is the logical reflection of the principle of bivalence [Dummett] |
8184 | Philosophers should not presume reality, but only invoke it when language requires it [Dummett] |
8185 | We can't make sense of a world not apprehended by a mind [Dummett] |
8163 | Since 'no bird here' and 'no squirrel here' seem the same, we must talk of 'atomic' facts [Dummett] |
8161 | We know we can state facts, with true statements [Dummett] |
8180 | 'That is red or orange' might be considered true, even though 'that is red' and 'that is orange' were not [Dummett] |
20339 | Classes rarely share properties with their members - unlike universals and types [Wollheim] |
8178 | Empirical and a priori knowledge are not distinct, but are extremes of a sliding scale [Dummett] |
20338 | We often treat a type as if it were a sort of token [Wollheim] |
6382 | The 'grain problem' says physical objects are granular, where sensations appear not to be [Sellars, by Polger] |
8174 | The theories of meaning and understanding are the only routes to an account of thought [Dummett] |
8175 | A theory of thought will include propositional attitudes as well as propositions [Dummett] |
8165 | To 'abstract from' is a logical process, as opposed to the old mental view [Dummett] |
8168 | To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning [Dummett] |
8181 | A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic [Dummett] |
8182 | Verificationism could be realist, if we imagined the verification by a superhuman power [Dummett] |
8183 | If truths about the past depend on memories and current evidence, the past will change [Dummett] |
8176 | We could only guess the meanings of 'true' and 'false' when sentences were used [Dummett] |
8170 | Sentences are the primary semantic units, because they can say something [Dummett] |
8169 | We can't distinguish a proposition from its content [Dummett] |
20343 | A love of nature must precede a love of art [Wollheim] |
20342 | Interpretation is performance for some arts, and critical for all arts [Wollheim] |
20348 | A criterion of identity for works of art would be easier than a definition [Wollheim] |
20347 | If beauty needs organisation, then totally simple things can't be beautiful [Wollheim] |
20331 | It is claimed that the expressive properties of artworks are non-physical [Wollheim] |
20345 | Some say art must have verbalisable expression, and others say the opposite! [Wollheim] |
20336 | Style can't be seen directly within a work, but appreciation needs a grasp of style [Wollheim] |
20337 | The traditional view is that knowledge of its genre to essential to appreciating literature [Wollheim] |
20333 | If artworks are not physical objects, they are either ideal entities, or collections of phenomena [Wollheim] |
20334 | The ideal theory says art is an intuition, shaped by a particular process, and presented in public [Wollheim] |
20335 | The ideal theory of art neglects both the audience and the medium employed [Wollheim] |
20340 | A musical performance has virtually the same features as the piece of music [Wollheim] |
20341 | An interpretation adds further properties to the generic piece of music [Wollheim] |
20332 | A drawing only represents Napoleon if the artist intended it to [Wollheim] |
8186 | Time is the measure of change, so we can't speak of time before all change [Dummett] |
8167 | If Presentism is correct, we cannot even say that the present changes [Dummett] |