Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation?', 'Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro' and 'Apriority as an Evaluative Notion'

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14 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
7068 If infatuation with science leads to bad scientism, its rejection leads to obscurantism [Critchley]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
7075 To meet the division in our life, try the Subject, Nature, Spirit, Will, Power, Praxis, Unconscious, or Being [Critchley]
7069 The French keep returning, to Hegel or Nietzsche or Marx [Critchley]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
9161 Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
9160 Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
9164 We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
8793 If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
8792 Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what [Sellars]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
9165 Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
9162 Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
9166 People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
9163 If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
8791 The concept of 'green' involves a battery of other concepts [Sellars]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
7067 Food first, then ethics [Critchley]