Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation?', 'Plato on Parts and Wholes' and 'Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge'

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19 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
15842 An ad hominem refutation is reasonable, if it uses the opponent's assumptions [Harte,V]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
19081 Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds [Davidson, by Donnellan]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
15841 Mereology began as a nominalist revolt against the commitments of set theory [Harte,V]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
15858 Traditionally, the four elements are just what persists through change [Harte,V]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
15848 Mereology treats constitution as a criterion of identity, as shown in the axiom of extensionality [Harte,V]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
15837 What exactly is a 'sum', and what exactly is 'composition'? [Harte,V]
15839 If something is 'more than' the sum of its parts, is the extra thing another part, or not? [Harte,V]
15838 The problem with the term 'sum' is that it is singular [Harte,V]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
8806 The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality [Davidson]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
8252 Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons [Davidson, by McDowell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
8255 Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally [McDowell on Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
8804 Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
8793 If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
8792 Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what [Sellars]
8802 Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
8801 Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
8805 Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects [Davidson]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
8791 The concept of 'green' involves a battery of other concepts [Sellars]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
18703 Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' [Davidson, by Button]