Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality', 'Action, Reasons and Causes' and 'Ordinary Objects'

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31 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
14480 Maybe analytic truths do not require truth-makers, as they place no demands on the world [Thomasson]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 6. Entailment
14471 Analytical entailments arise from combinations of meanings and inference rules [Thomasson]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
14493 Existence might require playing a role in explanation, or in a causal story, or being composed in some way [Thomasson]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
7949 Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
14491 Rival ontological claims can both be true, if there are analytic relationships between them [Thomasson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
14489 Theories do not avoid commitment to entities by avoiding certain terms or concepts [Thomasson]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
14485 Ordinary objects may be not indispensable, but they are nearly unavoidable [Thomasson]
14487 The simple existence conditions for objects are established by our practices, and are met [Thomasson]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
21651 It is analytic that if simples are arranged chair-wise, then there is a chair [Thomasson, by Hofweber]
14486 Eliminativists haven't found existence conditions for chairs, beyond those of the word 'chair' [Thomasson]
14467 Ordinary objects are rejected, to avoid contradictions, or for greater economy in thought [Thomasson]
14479 To individuate people we need conventions, but conventions are made up by people [Thomasson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
14481 Wherever an object exists, there are intrinsic properties instantiating every modal profile [Thomasson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
14482 If the statue and the lump are two objects, they require separate properties, so we could add their masses [Thomasson]
14483 Given the similarity of statue and lump, what could possibly ground their modal properties? [Thomasson]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
14476 Identity claims between objects are only well-formed if the categories are specified [Thomasson]
14477 Identical entities must be of the same category, and meet the criteria for the category [Thomasson]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
14478 Modal Conventionalism says modality is analytic, not intrinsic to the world, and linguistic [Thomasson]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
14466 A chief task of philosophy is making reflective sense of our common sense worldview [Thomasson]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
14475 How can causal theories of reference handle nonexistence claims? [Thomasson]
14474 Pure causal theories of reference have the 'qua problem', of what sort of things is being referred to [Thomasson]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
14488 Analyticity is revealed through redundancy, as in 'He bought a house and a building' [Thomasson]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 2. Duration of an Action
20020 If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20072 We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
20045 Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
23734 The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M]
23737 Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson]
20075 Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R]
6664 Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe]
3395 Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / e. Liberal community
22818 Liberals are not too individualistic, because people recognise and value social relations [Kymlicka]